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INTERNATIONAL TRADE WITH ENDOGENOUS TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
ABSTRACT
To explain why trade restrictions sometimes speed up
worldwide growth and sometimes slow it down, we exploit an
analogy with the theory of consumer behavior. Substitution
effects make demand curves slope down, but income effects can
increase or decrease the slope, and can sometimes overwhelm the
substitution effect. We decompose changes in the worldwide
growth rate into two effects (integration and redundancy) that
unambiguously slow down growth, and a third effect (allocation)
that can either speed it up or slow it down. We study two types
of trade restrictions to illustrate the use of this
decomposition. The first is across the board restrictions on
traded goods in an otherwise perfect market. The second is
selective protection of knowledge—intensive goods in a world with
imperfect intellectual property rights. In both examples, we
show that for trade between similar regions such as Europe and
North America, the first two effects dominate; starting from free
trade, restrictions unambiguously reduce worldwide growth.
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IRPS NBER
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San Diego
La Jolla, CA 92093In a model of endogenous growth with increasing returns, one of us (Romer, 1990b)
showed that a reduction in the extent of the market brought about by trade restrictions
leads to a decrease in the worldwide rate of growth. Using essentially the same model of
growth, Grossman and Helpman (1990) showed that in some circumstances, trade
restrictions could nevertheless increase the worldwide rate of growth.
In this paper, we relate these apparently contradictory results by using a
decomposition of the change in the growth rate that is similar to the decomposition of a
change in demand into a substitution effect that can be signed based on a priorireasoning
and an income effect that cannot. We identify two effects of trade restrictions, which we
label the integration effect and the redundancy effect, that unambiguously decrease
worldwide growth rates. We identify a third effect of trade, the allocation effect, that can
either increase or decrease the rate of growth.
We use a model with two fundamental sectors: a research and development sector
that produces the new ideas that make continued growth possible, and a manufacturing
sector that makes use of these ideas and produces physical capital and consumption goods.
Output from each of these sectors can be described in terms of a reduced form equation
that depends on basic inputs such as physical capital, human capital, and labor used in the
sector. The allocation effect refers to changes sectorial output induced by changes in the
allocation of basic inputs between the sectors. After trade opens, each country reallocates
resources toward the sector in which it has a comparative advantage. As is clear from the
dassical theory of trade, allocation effects will be larger when the differences in the
endowments or technologies of two trading partners are large.
In contrast to allocation effects, which link different sectors in the same country,
integration effects link the same sector in different countries. Trade induces integration
effects in a sector if its reduced form equation exhibits increasing returns. Increasing
returns at the level of the sector could be associated with external effects arising from
knowledge spillovers or with monopolistic competition between firms that supply a diverse
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set of specialized inputs used in production in the sector. If they are present, worldwide
output from this sector will be larger when the two national sectors are integrated.
Trade restrictions will have a redundancy effect if they induce redundant research
effort. When we measure the integration effect, we take as given the set of specialized
inputs and pieces of knowledge available in each country. We ask merely whether output
increases as the existing inputs and ideas flow more easily between the two countries.
Redundancy is an inherently dynamic effect. Since the set of goods and ideas are growing
over time, closer economic ties between nations can influence the new inputs and ideas that
are produced. Redundancy occurs when the same specialized input or idea is invented or
discovered twice, once in each country.
The integration or redundancy effects are defined holding constant the allocation of
basic inputs between the manufacturing and research sectors, so it is possible to talk of an
effect that takes place in one sector only. By definition, redundancy occurs only in the
research sector. Since trade restrictions impede the exploitation of international increasing
returns and since both integration and redundancy effects arise from increasing returns,
both effects have unambiguously negative effects on output. Through its action in the
manufacturing sector, the integration effect of trade restrictions decreases the level of
income. Through their action in the research sector, both integration and redundancy
effects decrease the rate of growth.
Since allocation effects link the manufacturing and research sectors, allocation
effects always induce offsetting changes in the output of the sectors. If resources are shifted
into manufacturing, they are shifted out of research. Hence, if the allocation effects of
trade restricions have a positive level effect, they have a negative growth effect. Moreover,
there are no simple conditions that characterize which sector gains resources when trade
policy is changed. In general, allocation effects can increase or decrease the rate of growth.
With these informal definitions, the apparent conflict between the results described
in the beginning can be resolved. In the thought experiment undertaken in the first paper3
(Romer 1990b), the trading partners are identical, so the allocation effect of trade is small,
and in fact tends to reinforce the integration and redundancy effects. Trade restrictions
between identical nations unambiguously decrease the worldwide rate of growth. In the
experiment carried out by Grossman and Helpman (1990), trading partners have different
technologies, 80 the allocation effect can be large. As they show, it can overwhelm the
other effects. Growth can therefore speedup when trade restrictions are imposed.
To illustrate the use of our decomposition, we study two specific examples of trade
restrictions. These examples extend the analysis of trade between identical nations. Our
decision to focus on identical countries was guided partly by the belief that the
decomposition is easier to grasp in this context. It applies, nonetheless, in all settings.
Our decision also reflects the division of labor in research. To get a comprehensive picture
of trade and growth, readers should also consult the growing literature on the growth
effects of trade between asymmetrical countries, e.g. Dinopouios, Oehmke, and Segerstrom
(1990), Feenstra (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1989a, 1989b ,1989c ,1989d), Lucas
(1988), Segerstrom, Anat and Dinopoulos (1990), and Young (1990).
In our first example, trade restrictions take the form of an across the board tariff,
and we focus on allocation effects. One of the surprising results is that allocation effects
can be present at all in the context of trade between countries with identical technologies
and endowments. Beside showing why this is so, this example illustrates the ambiguity of
the connection between allocation effects and growth. Starting from the point where the
tariff equals zero, the growth rate decreases as the tariff rate increases. As the tariff
continues to increase, the growth rate reaches a minimum, and then begins to increase. In
our example, the growth rate does not, however, return all the way back to the free trade
growth rate. (See figure 3 below for a plot of the growth rate as a function of the tariff
rate.)
In our second example, we consider selective protection of specific goods in a world
in which intellectual property rights are less then perfect. This lets us consider the4
simultaneous effects of reallocation and redundancy. To keep the length of paper
manageable, we focus only on these two effects. In a companion paper, (Rivera-Batiz and
Romer, 1991) we concentrate on the integration effect, with special emphasis on its action
in the research sector that is the engine of growth.
Our examples in both papers were chosen primarily with a view toward illustrating
the decomposition that we propose into allocation, integration, and redundancy effects.
The strong conclusions that emerge from these examples are nevertheless of some interest
in their own right. Taken together, our two papers show that there is a strong
presumption that trade restrictions between similar regions like North America and Europe
will reduce worldwide rates of growth.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we describe a generic two
sector model of endogenous growth that can be used to define scale, redundancy and
allocation effects more formally. Section 3 then presents the specific model of endogenous
growth that is used in this paper. Sections 4 and 5 present the two main examples. A
conclusion summarizes the results and describes limitations and extensions. Detailed
algebraic calculations are presented in an Appendix.
2. Scale, Allocation, and Redundancy
Before delving into the specifics of the model considered here, it is useful to describe
integration, allocation and redundancy effects in a more general context. Consider the
following representation of a growth model. Suppose that there are two broad sectors in
the economy. The growth sector produces the input that makes sustained growth possible.
In the model presented below, we refer to this input as the state of the technology and
denote it by the letter A. We call the sector that produces A the R&D sector. Other
models give a different interpretation to the input that sustains growth (e.g. a special form5
of capital or education) and to the sector that produces it, but the two sector structure of
these models is similar to the structure we consider here.
The second sector in our generic model behaves like the neoclassical growth model.
It makes use of A and produces all tangible goods such as consumption goods and physical
capital. We need a name for this sector, and it is convenient to refer to this sector as the
manufacturing sector, in a very broad sense of the term. It indudes all activities in the
economy other than R&D.
The usual formulation of the neoclassical model describes output Y as a function of
capital I, labor L, and the state of the technology A. We distinguish human capital if
from labor L and add it to the list of inputs because we assume that research is relatively
human capital intensive and that manufacturing is relatively labor and physical capital
intensive. Using a subscript 1' to denote inputs that are used in the sector that produces
physical goods, we can write output I as
1= C÷i= F(111,L1,11,A). (1)
As in the usual one sector formulation, manufacturing output Y can be split between
consumption C and increases in the capital stock K.
Output in the R&D sector can be written as
=
I(11A,LA,hA, (2)
The mnemonic here is 2 for research. The subscript A denotes the inputs devoted to the
research sector, which produces increases in the stock of A. In both equations (1) and
(2), the input A is treated differently from the other basic inputs. Inputs like if, L, and K
are rivalrous. They can be used in only one sector at a time. In contrast, the knowledge6
represented by A is nonrival. No subscript on A is necessary because the entire stock of
knowledge represented by A can be used in both sectors at the same time.
As noted in the introduction, we allow for the possibility of increasing returns in
both of the reduced form equations (1) and (2). How integration between the same sector
in different countries is achieved depends on the way in which sector-wide increasing
returns are supported in a decentralized equilibrium with many firms. We consider two
alternatives. The increasing returns could be purely external, arising from knowledge
spillovers. In this case, closer integration between firms in the same sector and in different
nations is achieved by international flows of ideas. Alternatively, the basic inputs could be
connected to the final sectorial output through a large set of specialized activities and
intermediate inputs that are provided by monopolistically competitive firms. In this case,
integration is achieved by permitting flows of the intermediate inputs between the
countries. In either case, if the reduced form equation for the sector exhibits increasing
returns, the combined output of all firms in the sector will fall when the flow of ideas or
intermediate inputs between the two countries is limited by trade restrictions, and will
reach a minimum when the sector in one country operates in isolation from the other.
We assume that there are increasing returns with knowledge spillovers in the R&D
sector, and increasing returns with specialized inputs in the manufacturing sector. This
means that the degree of integration in the manufacturing sector is determined solely by
trade in specialized inputs in production. In the research sector, it is the process of
communication of ideas, as fostered by telecommunications networks, printed media,
international travel, study, and investment by multinational corporations that determines
the degree of integration.
This strict separation is convenient and captures what we think are the most
important effects in these different sectors, but it paints a stylized picture that is too
simple. Knowledge spillovers are doubtless important in manufacturing, and anyone who
has ever seen a laboratory knows that a vast number of specialized inputs are used in7
research. The formal model can be extended to take account of the world where both
mechanisms are present in both sectors. For example, in the companion paper, we use a
model with specialized inputs in both R&D and manufacturing (Rivera-Batiz and Romer,
1991). Devoting too much attention to how increasing returns are decentralized would,
however, detract from one of the basic points of our analysis: it is the presence of sector-
wide increasing returns that generates integration effects. How the increasing returns are
decentralized is of secondary importance.
The three channels through which trade policy can affect the rate of growth are
most clearly distinguished if one contrasts the extremes of total isolation and complete
integration into a single economy. Let Z, and Z4 represent the vectors of inputs used in
manufacturing and R&D respectively. With total isolation between two identical
economies, worldwide manufacturing output is twice the Output in each country,
21' =2F(Z).If the reduced form function F(.) exhibits increasing returns because of the
underlying specialized intermediate goods that make use of the nonrival input A,
integration will increase worldwide output. (For a discussion of why nonrival inputs induce
increasing returns, see Romer 1990a). In the definition of a pure integration effect, we
assume that the split between Z, and Z in each country is held constant. Integration
would cause worldwide manufacturing output to increase from 2F(Z1') to F(2Z1). This is
the integration effect in manufacturing. It increases the level of Output associated with any
given value of A, but it does not affect the rate of growth of A. Thus we say that the
integration effect in manufacturing has a level effect but no growth effect.
When two research sectors operate in isolation using inputs ZA, worldwide research
output can lie anywhere in the interval between 1(14) and 21(14). The advantage of a
nonrival good like an idea is that once it has been produced, it can be used by everyone in
the world. This means that there is no economic value to devoting resources to produce
the idea again if it already exists somewhere else. When resources are used to produce a
design idea that already exists, the worldwide stock of A does not increase. If the two8
R&D sectors operating in isolation produce solutions to exactly the same problems, then
total worldwide production of A will be exactly equal to the production in either country,
1(14). If, on the other hand, there is no redundant research effort, worldwide research
output will be twice that in either country, 21(14).
As a result, when two isolated research sectors become more closely linked,
worldwide research output can increase for two reasons. First, redundancy can be reduced
or eliminated. The communication links and competitive pressures induced by closer ties
will create incentives to avoid rediscovering the wheel. This is what we call the
redundancy effect. Second, if there are increasing returns in the R&D sector, then even if
there is no redundancy, integration will increase research output from 21(14) to 1(2ZA).
This is the integration effect in the R&D sector.
The analysis of any change in policy toward other nations can therefore be separated
into three conceptual steps. The first step is to hold constant the degree of integration of
the two economies (that is, hold constant any constraints on flows of existing goods,
services, and ideas) and to hold constant the allocation of resources between the different
sectors in each economy. Then one can observe the degree to which firms and individuals
reduce the degree of redundancy in their innovative activities in anticipation of increased
future flows of goods, services, and ideas. Thus for example, an announced plan to open
trade in goods (say in the near future) could induce a firm to stop trying to produce copies
of goods available abroad and to start producing some unique specialized input. This
isolates the redundancy effect of the policy change. By definition, it arises only in the
research sector.
Next, the degree of integration between the different sectors is permitted to change
as additional flows of existing goods and ideas take place. As ideas flow more readily
between the two national research sectors and as firms take advantage of greater diversity
in specialized inputs in manufacturing, the integration effects increase output in each
sector. For example, integration could take place as an existing idea previously known9
only to researchers in one country becomes available for use in the second country.
Alternatively, integration could increase because an existing piece of specialized equipment
that previously had been used in manufacturing in only one country becomes available for
use in the second. At this stage we are still holding constant the stock of basic inputs in
the two different sectors in the two economies.
Finally, in the last step, it is possible to compare the rate of return to the different
basic inputs in the two sectors. These will generally not be equal after the change in trade
policy, and it is then possible to analyze the allocation effect —thereallocation of inputs
needed to bring rates of return back into equality.
The functions F(.) and I(.) described in this section are reduced form
expressions for manufacturing and research output as functions of the amounts of the basic
inputs devoted to each sector. The next section describes structural production functions
and the market arrangements that lead to reduced forms of this kind. For a heuristic
comparison of isolation and complete integration, reduced form expressions are sufficient;
but to characterize the intermediate degree of integration induced by policies like across
the board tariffs or selective protection, a structural specification is required.
3.Specificationof the model
3.1 Functional forms in the manufacturing sector
The detailed structure of the production technology for the manufacturing sector is
taken from Romer (1990b). The fundamental assumptions are that many types of capital
goods are used in production, that these are not perfect substitutes, and that technological
progress arises from the invention of new types of capital goods. To formalize this, let i
index the different types of capital goods and let x(i) denote the usage of each type of10
good. Producers of consumption or capital goods face a production function of the form
y =ff°Lfifx( )l_Q.-fi di. (3)
This production function is homogeneous of degree 1 in I, L, and the list of durables
z(i).Firms in this sector can therefore be assumed to be price takers. This production
function has the feature that it is possible to produce output even if z( i) is equal to 0 for
many goods i. At every date, there are many durables that are potentially usable but
that caimot be used because they have not been invented yet. Good i has been invented
if iA.Hence, the upper limit of integration can be changed fromto A(t) at each
date i; however, it must be recognized that what changes over time is not the production
function itself, but rather the set of inputs that are available. This specification exploits
the kind of additively separable functional form used by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) to model
differentiated consumption goods. It also follows Ethier (1982) in that the relevant
differentiated commodities are inputs in production rather than consumption goods. Here,
there is a single final consumption good.
To derive a reduced form expression for Y as a function of II, L, A, and I, one
must also specify how z(.) is related to I and A. The different capital goods are
produced in an intermediate goods sector that the reduced form specification of output
I =F(I!,L,I',A)hides. It uses designs for new types of capital goods from the research
sector. If firm i owns a design for capital good i, we assume that it can produce physical
units of the capital good according to the same manufacturing technology as that used in
the production of consumption goods. As a normalization of the unit of measurement of
the durables, assume that one unit of forgone consumption generates one unit of any
capital good. (Strictly speaking, one unit of consumption goods corresponds to one unit of
capital for all different types of capital on a set of types of measure 1.)11
Let I denote the total amount of capital goods in existence in the economy,
A
I' =f' z(i)di.Because all of the different z(i) goods are produced according to the
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same production technology, this sum across different types of goods makes sense. It
represents the cost of the total quantity of durable capital goods in units of forgone
consumption goods, and is close to the usual national income account measure of total
physical capital.
It is now a simple matter to solve for the list z(.)andwrite down the reduced form
expression for Y as a function of Ii,, L, I and A. Because the production technology for
consumption goods and for each of the different capital goods is the same, total output in
the manufacturing sector is the sum I =C+ I. Given A, it follows by symmetry that
x(i) will take on a common value =I/Afor all i between 0 and A. Substituting
the expression forinto equation (3) then yields
I =F(if,L,f,A)=(ifA)a(LA)Il_a_fl.
Even though the underlying production function for manufacturing goods described
in equation (3) is homogeneous of degree 1, this reduced from expression is homogeneous of
degree 1+a+fi in if, L, A, and I. By Euler's theorem, it is impossible for this sector to be
decentralized using perfect competition; paying each of the inputs if, L, I, A its marginal
product would more than exhaust total output. There are no spillovers and no external
effects in the manufacturing sector. The increasing returns to scale are decentralized in
this model through imperfect competition. The producer of good i is the only supplier of
this good. It therefore charges the monopoly price for it. Because of competition between
different firms to produce good i, the present discounted value of the stream of monopoly
profits will be equal to the price that is paid for the design for good i. This is how
compensation is generated for the research sector.12
3.2 Functional forms and decentralization in the
research sector
We assume that neither labor nor durables are used in research. Output of new
designs is a function only of the stock of human capital employed and the stock of ideas
that someone who does research has access to. This simple assumption is intended to
reflect the fact that research is relatively intensive in human capital and ideas. Let A and
*
A denote the stock of designs that have been produced in the home and foreign countries
respectively. Let A\1T0thl denote total stock of designs in the world as a whole. Because of
redundancy, A A + A .Toisolate the effects of restrictions on trade in goods, we
will assume throughout this paper that integration in the sense of full communication of
ideas is possible. Thus the entire stock of ideas contained in A0rld is available for
researchers in each country. The effects of limitations of communication are described in a
separate paper (Rivera—Batiz and Romer, 1990,) Then the output of designs for new goods
in the home country can then be written as
A =
SIJA (4a)
In the foreign country it is
A =6ff4A0. (4b)13
This kind of specification is discussed in Romer (1990b). This model of research is
easy to work with, but it has the disadvantage that it lets none of the specialized durable
goods enter as an inputs in research. Machine tools probably are not important inputs in
research, but other durables like computers are. Our companion paper (Rivera—Batiz and
Romer, 1990)describesa parallel model that does let physical capital enter as inputs in
research.
Decentralization of production decisions in the research sector involves spillovers of
knowledge. The direct dependence of A on AW0 reflects the role of external effects of
spillovers of ideas from previous patents both at home and abroad. Holders of patents on
the previous designs do not have any technological or legal means for preventing designers
of new goods from using the ideas implicit in existing designs for purposes of discovering
new designs. For this reason A is not compensated in the research sector.
On the other hand, the holder of a patent on a design does have a legally enforceable
property right on the use of the design for the purpose of manufacturing the associated
good. Patents on designs confer monopoly power, and the associated monopoly rents
provide the compensation for the researcher. Decentralization in manufacturing relies
entirely on monopolistic competition while decentralization in research relies entirely on
external effects.
3.3. Preferences
The technology so far describes the accumulation equations for I' and A. The
stocks of L and I are taken as given. It would be useful to consider an extension that
allowed H to increase over time as the average level of human capital in the population
increases, but doing so here would add an additional state variable and require analysis off14
of a balanced growth path. This modification would contribute little to the analysis of
trade policy and would greatly increase the complexity of the arguments.
It remains to specify the preferences that determine the split of resources between
consumption C,investmentin I, and investment in A. For comparability with other
work, it is useful to evaluate this model in the context of the standard Ramsey preferences,
U=fW C'e_P dt.
0
The only way in which these preferences enter the computation of the balanced growth
equilibrium is through the relationship that they imply between the rate of growth of
consumption and the market interest rate:
r= p+c(C/C). (5)
(Fora derivation of this result, see the Appendix.) Any other rule that pins down the
interest rate and the savings rate would suffice to close the model.
4. Across the Board Protection
This section describes the equilibrium in a world with two perfectly symmetric
countries that impose the same tariff on all imported goods used in production. As noted
above, throughout the paper, we assume that ideas can flow freely between different
countries and focus only on flows of goods. In this section, we will also assume that
international patent protection for designs is perfect so no copying of existing designs takes
place.15
With these assumptions, we have ruled out any change in the degree of integration
of the research sectors in the different countries and any change in redundancy in research.
(The tariff will induce integration effects in the manufacturing sector that will reduce the
level of income, but the focus here is not growth effects, not level effects.) For the example
considered in this section, trade restrictions can therefore affect the rate of growth only by
reallocating inputs between the growth and manufacturing sectors. In the next section we
weaken the assumption that international patent protection is perfect and analyze a
situation entailing redundant R&D. As noted above, consideration of the integration
effects in the research sector is sufficiently intricate to merit a separate treatment in the
companion paper.
To describe a model with trade in goods explicitly, more notation is needed.
Without trade, the quantity of an intermediate input i that is used in a country is
identical to the amount that is produced, and both usage and domestically produced stock
can be denoted by the variable z(i).Withtrade, production and usage in a country will
differ. In what follows, z( i) still denotes the stock of durable good i that has been
produced by firms in the home country; z*( i*) denotes the production of a different good
in the foreign country. The goods indexed by i and i are completely different goods by
assumption. Input 10 on the i list could be a hard disk made in the United States;
input 10 on the j list could be a computer display screen made in Japan. By our strong
assumption on international patent protection, no firm creates a design for a good that
already exists.
The notation used here reflects the fact that the index labels i and i are merely
names. The properties of a good are independent of which index is used to represent the
good or the magnitude of the index. One can think of a master list of intermediate inputs
from which all of the goods indexed by i or i are drawn. Particular intermediate
inputs are placed on the i and i lists as they are introduced, according to the country
in which they are discovered.16
To describe the use of durable inputs by a final output firm in the home country, it
is useful to have a separate notation for domestically produced and imported inputs. Let
d(i) denote domestic usage of durables produced in the home country, and let in(i*)
denotehome usage of durables produced in the foreign country. Then manufacturing
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0 0
The home country imports j* goods while the foreign country imports i goods. Some
portion of these goods are used at home, the rest are exported. Figure 1 shows the usage
of both domestically produced i durables and imported i durables in the home country.
Figure 2 illustrates the production of i goods in the home country. Because of the
symmetry between the different types of durables, domestic and foreign goods would be
used at the same level if there were no tariffs. Both of the figures are drawn under the
assumption that a positive tariff is charged by each government on imports of durables.
A domestic producer of an i-type good buys a design from someone who has
developed it in the research sector. The firm that rents out durable good i maximizes
profit, choosing a level of output d(i) to supply in the domestic market and a separate
level n*(i) to supply in the foreign market. Because of the tariff charged on goods sold in
the foreign market, the firm is free to segment these two markets and price discriminate,
subject to the arbitrage constraint that the domestic price for the good must lie between17
Quantity of each input used in production
1* _________________ .I_______
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Figure1: Inputs used in production at times t and t'>t.
the foreign price less the tariff and the foreign price inclusive of the tariff.
The domestic government imposes a tariff ronthe imports of m,sothe price paid
by domestic purchasers is (1+r) times the price received by the foreign seller. The foreign
government imposes a tariff r.Inboth countries, the tariff revenue is rebated to the
consumers via a lump sum distribution. By the symmetry assumption, randrare
assumed to be the same, as are L and L* and if and if*• The symmetric case has the
advantage that the trade balance equation is always satisfied automatically.
Figures 1 and 2 also illustrate the evolution of the set of durables over time.
Because of the symmetry among the goods, the durable good i is supplied in the same
quantity 2inthe home market for all i. Because of the tariff, a smaller quantityis
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Figure2: Production of inputs at times tandt'>t.
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home,A the comparable range of inputs produced abroad. Over time, A, A,and
=A+allgrow, butandremain constant. (For derivations of these
results, see the Appendix.)
As noted above, tariffs change the degree of integration in the manufacturing sector,
but they do not affect integration in the research sector. We have also assumed that
international protection for patents is perfect, so no redundancy occurs. As a result, the
only growth effects that changes in the tariff rate can have stem from allocation effects
which shift human capital between manufacturing and research. As noted in the
introduction, the surprising result in this model (explicitly derived in the appendix), is that
the level of human capital used in research= isnot a monotonic function of the
tariff rate, and hence neither is the rate of growth. The expression for the common rate of
A(t) A(t')19
growthin the two countries is
25ff —Apf(r) gr,— Aoj(r)+1'
where the function 1(r)isdefined by
—(1—a—fl)/( a+fl)
fr — 1+(1+r) '/ —
1+(1+r)'()
Figure3 plots an illustrative graph of the growth rate g(r). (The specific
parameter values used to generate this graph are described in the Appendix.) For any
r>0,the growth rate is strictly less than the rate of growth g(O) with no tariffs. The
growth rate g(r)firstfalls with r,reachesa minimum, and then begins to increase, in
the limit as rgoesto w,g(r)approaches the free trade growth rate g(O). As the figure
shows, however, the return back to the zero tariff growth rate is very slow.
This nonmonotonicity of the growth rate in the tariff rate arises because two
offsetting forces influence the allocation of human capital. Symmetric increases in the
tariff rate r(= r*) haveeffects on the return to human capital in both research and in
manufacturing. An increase in r represents a tax by the foreign government on the
monopoly rents that the purchaser of a new design can extract from exports of the good. A
higher tariff reduces imports by the foreign country ,n* and therefore depresses the price of
new designs. Everything else equal, this would cause human capital to shift out of
research.
Everything else, however, is not equal. An increase in r (which under our
symmetry assumption also implies an increase in r*)alsoreduces the quantity of imported
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Figure3: The worldwide growth rate as a function of the common tariff rate
marginal productivity of human capital in manufacturing. The net effect on the allocation
of human capital depends on which of these effects is larger. Equation A.12 in the
appendix shows that the marginal product of human capital in manufacturing depends on a
term proportional to m(r)l_a_fi, whereas the revenue extracted by the holder of a patent
on a new design depends on a term proportional to (l+r)_1,n*(r)l_0_fl.Bysymmetry,
in(r)= m*(r). Initially,the effect on patent revenue,
+(1+r)_1(1—a—3)m_has a larger absolute value than the effect in manufacturing
(1_a_fl)m_'_ .Asrgoestoand (l÷r) goes to 0, the relative magnitudes
reverse.
When there are two effects that conflict, there will typically exist modifications of
the model that will cause the effect that dominates to change. The correct general21
conclusion that can be drawn is that to the extent that trade restrictions have only
allocation effects, the restrictions can have an ambiguous effect on the rate of growth. This
is especially true in cases where there is an important asymmetry between two trading
partners because the allocation effects of trade are likely to be larger in this case.
The example presented here shows that starting from realistic levels of tariffs, if two
similar countries increase their tariffs on imports produced in a monopolistically
competitive sector, the net effect will be to drive resources out of that sector. This will
reduce the rate at which goods in these sectors are introduced because the dominant effect
of an increase in the tariffs is to reduce the rents that provide compensation for research.
If the assumption made here is correct —thatgoods with high fixed research and
development costs play an important role in generating growth —thenstarting from
realistic levels of tariffs, symmetric worldwide increases in tariffs on the goods that result
from research and development will reduce the worldwide rate of growth.
5. Selective Protection with imperfect intellectual property rights
In the last section, the assumption that ideas flowed freely between nations meant
that trade policy had no effect on integration in the research sector. The assumption that
patent protection for ideas was perfect meant that regardless of the trade regime, no
redundancy occurred. As a result, trade policy could affect the rate of growth only because
of the induced allocation effects. In this section, we weaken the assumption that patent
protection is perfect and show that trade in goods can reduce redundancy as well.22
5.1 Patent Protection, Copying, and Trade Barriers
If there is no trade in goods, there is no competitive reason to design a good that is
different from one that exists in a foreign market. If we assume that it is cheaper tocopy a
foreign good than it is to design a new one, there is an incentive to copy if the costs of
circumventing the legal protection are not too high. If, on the other hand, there is trade in
goods, a firm faces an offsetting incentive to produce an entirely new design; a new good
generates monopoly rents, whereas an existing good will lead to a duopoly game with
another producer. Holding constant the degree of legal protection, trade in goods alone can
therefore reduce redundant research effort by reducing the payoffs to someone who copies.
We formalize the idea that it is possible to circumvent patent protection and copy
an existing design in the following way. Given a stock of general knowledge and a
quantity if of human capital, it is possible to produce SIA new designs per unit time or
OIA copies of existing designs, with 0> 5. Part of the design cost required for copying a
good might be needed to uncover aspects of the good that are not immediately apparent.
An additional part of the design work is needed to make design changes that have no effect
on how the good functions, but are intended merely to avoid patent infringement charges
under the legal system. The assumption that 0 is bigger than S then implies that the
amount of research needed to understand an existing good and to circumvent the patent is
smaller then the research needed to design a new good.
To make our point as simply as possible, we want to make assumptions which
guarantee that a firm that can copy a good and compete with an existing producer will not
choose to do so, but that a firm that can copy a foreign good and sell in a market that is
protected from the foreign producer's competition will choose to do so. For simplicity,
protection from the foreign producer is assumed to take the form of selective quantity
limits imposed by the government on imports. Imports for a fixed fraction q of the23
durable goods produced abroad will be set to zero. Equivalently, a prohibitive tariff is
applied to these goods.
A researcher in the domestic country then has three options: (1) designing a new
good and earning monopoly rents in the world market; (2) copying a good from abroad that
is not allowed to enter the domestic market and earning monopoly rents from the domestic
market alone; and (3) copying a good that is already being sold in the domestic market and
playing a duopoly game In the second case, the copying firm is assumed to be unable to
sell in the foreign market because the foreign firm whose good has been denied entry into
the home market can induce its government to restrict imports of the copies.
In the symmetric case considered here, the world market is twice the size of either
domestic market. For the constant elasticity demand curves used here, prices are
independent of market size so that profits are proportional to the size of the market. It is
therefore more profitable to copy an excluded foreign good and sell it in the protected
domestic market than it is to develop an entirely new good whenever copying is more than
twice as easy as innovating, i.e. whenever 0isgreater than 25. We assume that this is
true.
We also need an upper bound on how easy it is to copy. If copying were arbitrarily
inexpensive (i.e. if 0werearbitrarily large) it would be worthwhile to copy a good that
has not been excluded and play a duopoly game even if that game yields a very small
profit. We impose a second restriction on 0thatavoids this possibility. Specifically, we
assume that 0isnot too large and that the expected payoff from the duopoly game that
would ensue after copying is not large. For example, if firms expect Bertrand competition
in the duopoly game, copying will never take place in the absence of protection, no matter
how big 0isrelative to 5.Iffirms expect Cournot competition, copying will not take
place unless 0exceeds25 by a large enough margin to make duopoly a feasible
equilibrium. For instance, in the case in which a+ equals .7, copying is not profitable if
0isless than 35.24
Given these assumptions on 0 and 6 and implicitly on the duopoly game, the
most profitable strategy is to copy an excluded foreign good and sell it in a protected
market if this is possible. The next most profitable strategy is to design a new good and
sell it worldwide. The third strategy, to copy a good that is not excluded and play a
duopoly game, is dominated by the second strategy.
The notation must now reflect the existence of three types of goods. Goods indexed
by i continue to represent durable inputs designed and produced at home that are sold in
both the domestic and foreign markets. Symmetricafly, goods indexed by i represent
inputs designed and produced abroad that are sold in both markets. A new index j
rangingfrom 0 to J represents nontraded goods. The range of nontraded goods indicates
the total number of goods that have been designed in one country and copied in the other.
The total measure of copied goods J is proportional to the total amount of effort by
human capital that has been devoted to the socially worthless activity of producing
redundant designs.
From the point of view of the home country, a good can become a j good in one of
two ways. Either it is a newly designed good that is refused entry into the foreign market
by the foreign government, or it is a copy of a foreign good that is refused entry into the
home market by the domestic government. Since copying goods for sale in a protected
market generates pure profits, all goods that are denied entry into a country are copied.
As a result, the set of jgoodsis the same in the two countries.
The arbitrary timing assumed here is as follows. Over a small interval of time,
some new goods are introduced in the foreign market and are prohibited from entry into
the domestic market. The right to earn a pure profit by copying one of these goods and
selling it in the protected home market is allocated to a domestic firm. To allocate this
opportunity to copy, domestic firms could be required to bid for a license frorri the
government to produce such a good. To highlight the effects of trade alone, we assume
that no resources are wasted in deciding which domestic firm gets the right to produce25
copies in the domestic market. That is> we assume away rent seeking activities in the
usual sense. All of the unproductive effort expended here arises purely from effort exerted
to reverse engineer a good that has already been designed.
Some researchers at home are engaged in reverse engineering of the foreign> excluded
durable goods. Others produce new designs and sell them to firms that will manufacture
the new inputs. A firm begins manufacturing, attempts to export the good, and then is
told by the foreign government whether its good will be refused entry (which happens with
probability q) or allowed to enter (with probability 1—q). In keeping with the symmetry
assumption, the foreign and home governments exclude the same fraction q of goods from
the other country. Because this represents a diversillable risk> the price the manufacturer
pays for a design is the expected monopoly profit that it will generate. This is equal to q
times the monopoly profit that can be extracted from sales in the domestic market alone
plus 1—q times the monopoly profit that can be extracted from sales in the the home
market and the foreign market taken together.
The incentive for a government to prohibit imports of foreign goods comes from the
fact that this offers a way to capture ex post monopoly rents that would otherwise flow to
foreign nationals. A more direct way to expropriate these rents from foreigners is to
intentionally weaken patent protection, especially if this can be done in a selective way
that preserves intellectual property rights for domestic citizens but undermines them for
foreigners. Here we focus only on trade in goods and defer consideration of policy decisions
about patent rights and the legal system for future work. In the example we consider here,
we focus only on the ways in which restrictions on flows of goods can be used to aid in this
process of expropriation. We assume that patent protection applies equally toall designs
regardless of the ownership, and that the extent of patent protection is not varied when the
barriers to goods flows are varied (i.e. when the fraction of excluded goods q is varied.)26
5.2, Redundancy and Growth




fm(i*) di* +fn(j) di]. (7)
A producer of final goods in the home country can make use of the three types of goods.
For 0 ￿ i ￿ I, d( i) represents use of domestically designed and produced goods that are
sold in both markets. For 0jJ, n(j) represents the use of nontraded goods that are
produced at home. The total stock of designs produced in the home country A is equal to
the sum A =I+J.As before, m(ii) represents imports of goods designed and produced
*
abroad,iindexesthese goods. Now, however, z ranges from 0 to I instead of from
* *
o toA .Thetotal stock of goods designed and produced in the foreign country is A =
* * I+J,but only the I goods trade.
The expression for the output of final goods in the foreign country is symmetric with
that of the domestic country. A firm in the foreign country will use d*(j*) of locally
*
producedtraded goods for 0< z I .Itwill also use n*() of goods designed and
produced in the home country for 0i ￿ I, and n(j) units of nontraded goods for
0 <5<J.Note the difference in the notation that is induced by the redundancy. Both
lists n(.) and n*(.) depend on the same index 5. Good 34 on the 5 list is the same
good in each country, regardless of the country in which it was first designed and produced.
Since I and I measure the disjoint sets of traded inputs produced in each country, and
J measures the set of nontraded inputs available in each, the measure of the worldwide
stock of distinct inputs and distinct design knowledge is Aw0 =j ++ J<A+A.27
*
Tocomplete the specification of this model, it remains to describe how Aw0r,
I ,andJ evolve. Now there are three different activities in which human capital can be
used: manufacturing, denoted by ff; research on new goods, denoted now by 11N ("H" for
new); and copying of existing designs, denoted by Iii,(" C"for copy). When human capital
is used in research at home, the implied rate of growth of designs I that trade
internationally is
I = (1_q)6ffAW0. (8)
A quantity of human capital equal to 1N produces 611N new designs per unit time,
but oniy a fraction 1—q of these are allowed to trade internationally. Symmetrically, the
*
growthof I is given by
1* =(l_q*)SffAw0I. (9)
The quantity of nontraded intermediate inputs grows as new inputs produced at home are
excluded from the foreign market and as copying of foreign goods takes place at home:
J = qa5ffA' +OffCA0rld (lOa)
The range J grows by the same amount, for the same reasons, in the foreign country:
J = q6llA'
+OffCA0t (lob)
Because copying generates pure profits, it is constrained only by the supply of goods
produced abroad that are excluded from the home market. Consequently, lie, is28
determined by 014world =qo4AworldIt follows by substitution and symmetry that
*world world
J=qöff11A +qöllffA (11)
By adding equations (8), (9), and (11), it follows thatworld =+ I+Jis given by
world =s(111+ff;)Aworld. (12)
All human capital devoted to research on new goods contributes to the growth of A
world
The difference now is that a portion ofthe total worldwide stock of human capital
is devoted to the socially unproductive activity of copying existing designs.
Given the discussion so far, it should come as no surprise that increases in the
restrictions on trade in this model unambiguously reduce growth. First, the human capital
that is induced into copying acts like a reduction in total worldwide human capital.
Since the growth rate is increasing in the total stock of human capital, this reduces the rate
of growth. This is the redundancy effect of trade protection. In the absence of the trade
restrictions that create the incentive for copying, this amount of human capital would be
put to a socially productive use.
In addition, growth is lower still because copying acts like a tax on the revenue
generated by a new design. With probability q, all of the profit that would otherwise be
collected from the foreign market is taken away. This reduction in the marginal
productivity of human capital in research is not offset by any reduction in the marginal
productivity of human capital in manufacturing. The manufacturing industries in both
countries always use all of the inputs that exist in the world. Thus in this case, the
allocation effect of the copying acts unambiguously to reduce growth.29






This expression for g is monoton.ically decreasing in q.
6. Condusions
The first of our two examples shows that if North Americans were to use a tariff to
apply broad restrictions on all newly invented goods imported from Europe, and Europeans
put the same tariff on all newly invented goods from the United States, then invention
would be a less rewarding activity in both places and technological progress would slow
down. Formally, the result allows for the possibility that at very high levels of protection,
the effect of higher trade restrictions might be to reduce other opportunities so much that
more people become inventors despite the fact that returns to invention fall. The
theoretical results, like common sense, suggest that while logically possible, this possibility
is not important in practice.
The second example suggests that if Europeans and North Americans use targeted
protection for specific goods to extract ex post monopoly rents that would otherwise flow to
foreigners, research effort on new goods will be less rewarding, and valuable resources will
be diverted from manufacturing and research into socially useless redundant activities. For
both reasons, growth rates will fall.
Unambiguous results emerge in these two examples because of the specific details of
the experiments that we consider. Of particular importance, we impose symmetry30
throughout our analysis, in both the endowments and technologies faced by each country,
and in the policies that are implemented. This lets us highlight the sense in which trade
exploits international increasing returns, and lets us minimize the obscuring effects that
arise when trade induces large flows of resources between different sectors.
Our focus should not be taken to imply that differences in endowments,
technologies, or policies are always unimportant. For example, in their analysis of product
cycle model of trade between a developed North and a less developed South, Grossman and
Helpman (1989b,d) have shown that policy changes the make it easier for a less developed
Southern country to imitate goods invented in the North may speed up the worldwide rate
of growth. In this case, the redundancy effects of copying (which are bad for growth) are
overwhelmed by the allocation effect of shifting manufacturing from the North to the
South, and thereby freeing resources in the North for additional research. Additional
copying in this setting can increase the worldwide rate of growth.
In some settings, policy chosen by different countries will also be different. As first
noted by Frank Graham (1923) in his analysis of trade policy with Marshallian increasing
returns, the kind of policy favored by a developing country may be very different from that
favored by an advanced country. Followers may prefer some kind of infant industry
protection while leaders prefer free trade. For a recent analysis of this kind of issue in an
endogenous growth model, see Lucas (1988) and Young (1990).
Our results are therefore specific to a particular context —tradebetween similar
developed countries. Other questions posed in other contexts may well lead to different
answers. There results show, nonetheless, that the emerging theory of trade and growth
can generate unambiguous conclusions in cases of practical interest.
With the formalization of the new theory of trade (as carried out by Kruginan 1979,
1981, Lancaster 1980, Helpman 1981, and Ethier 1982), it is now clear that the gains from
trade can arise from at least two fundamental sources: differences in comparative
advantage and economy-wide increasing returns. One of the difficulties that these two31
effects present for theorists is that they sometimes offset each other. Consequently, it is no
longer possible to make completely general, unqualified statements about what the effects
of trade restrictions will be. When the model under consideration is augmented from a
static model or a dynamic model with steady states into a model with endogenous growth,
the multiplicity of possible outcomes can at first be all the more daunting.
But even though we know that demand curves sometimes slope down and sometimes
slope up, economists still have something useful to say about demand theory. We know
that in some problems (e.g. the response of savings to changes in the interest rate) income
effects can be very important and upward sloping demand curves are a real possibility. We
also know that in many other cases, income effects will reinforce substitution effects, or will
be small and can be ignored. In either of these cases, demand curves will slope down. By
combining a theoretical decomposition of price changes into income and substitution effects
with accumulated evidence about income elasticities, we have learned that there are many
cases where the effects of price changes can be predicted with confidence. We hope that
the decomposition proposed here can serve a similar purpose. Once economists have
developed similar evidence about the magnitude and direction of the allocation effects of
trade restrictions, we should be able to predict the effects that trade restrictions have on
growth with the same confidence as when we predict the effect of a price change on
demand.32
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Appendix
A.1 Results from section 4 in the text
The production function for the final output sector in the home country is given in
equation (6a). This constant returns to scale production function leads to the usual
indeterminacy in the number or price-taking firms and the scale of production for each
firm. Since aggregate output is determined, we can focus on the sector's total output and
derive the aggregate demand for each good z(i) by solving a maximization problem that
is conditional on given levels ofand L for the industry as a whole. Leaving aside the
exogenous wage bill, the maximization problem can be represented as
max Y(ff1,L,d(.),m(.)) —fr(i)d(i) di —f(1+r)P(i*)m(i*) di* (A.1)
,in + +
where d refers to the home price of domestic inputs andis the price received by
foreign producers for their exports. (Both of these prices, and all other prices quoted for
durables are rental prices.) We will henceforth treat the range of integration as being Ii
and implicitly treat any good with i >Aor z> A (that s any good that has not been
invented yet) as having an infinite price. The price Frn(1+r) is paid by domestic users of
foreign inputs; it is greater than the price received by foreign producers due to the tariff r
applied in the home country. The price of the single final output good, which is freely
traded, must be the same in the two countries. It is taken as the numeraire.
The first order necessary conditions for the choice of d( i) and ni( is) in the36
domestic manufacturing sector are:
(1__fi)4Lfid(i)° — = 0 (A.2)
(1_a_fi)ffLn(i*)°
—(1÷T)F;()=0 (A.3)
The implied derived demands for domestic and imported inputs are:
d(i) =(1_a_fl)1(a+fl)5a/(a+fi) LflI(a4.fl) (A.4)
,n(i*) =(1_a_fl)1/ff
a/(a÷13)L (l÷r)_h/(a)P;(i*)—1/(a+Ii) (A5)
An analogous procedure yields the first order necessary conditions for the foreign
country's choice of d*(i*) and ,n*(i) in the symmetric tariff case (r =
(1_a_fl)ff,OL*fld*(i)_a_fl_?*(i*)=0, (A.6)
(1_a_fi)40L*flm*(i)_0 —(1+r)Pm*(i)=0. (A.7)
The implied derived demands for locally produced and imported inputs abroad are:
d*(i*)=(l_a_fi)h1(U+fl)/"a/(a÷fl)L i3/(o+fl) *()_lI(a+f3) (A.8)
m*(i) =(i__fl)1/(04a/(a+f3) f/3/(a+3)(i+r)'m*("° (A.9)
Pis the price (set by foreign firms on foreign goods) of foreign inputs.(setby home
firmson goods imported by foreigners) is the price received by home producers. (1+r*)P.
is the price paid by the foreign users of these goods.37
In equilibrium, the production z(i)of a representative domestic input is equal to
the sum of domestic usage d( i) and exports m(1).Since all domestic producers face the
same demand and have identical cost functions, we can ignore the index i and write the
demand as a function of the appropriate price, d(Pd) and in*(F). Total production z of
an intermediate input in the home country can then be expressed as
Z(I'dPm*)= d(Pd)+m*(Fmj.
The presence of a tariff barrier generates a range ?, << (1+r)F,, within
which domestic producers can engage in price discrimination between foreign and domestic
markets. Outside of this range, purchasers in one country could earn arbitrage profits by
reselling in the other country. Domestic firms will set output levels in each market and
charge prices to maximize total profits. Recalling that the prices are rental prices, revenue
as a function of the quantities d and ,n* is Pd(d)d +Fm*(m*)m*.Because it costs one unit
of forgone output to produce one unit of capital, the flow opportuniLy cost of these units is
r(d+m*). The instantaneous rate of profit earned by the holder of the patent is therefore
=maxP(d)d + F (,n*)m* — r(d+m*).
Equatingeach market's marginal revenue to marginal costs and substituting for Fd(d) and
from (A.2) and (A.7), yields a pair of pricing equations for domestic and foreign
sales:=f/i—a—fland=ni—a—fl.These pricing functions represent identical
markups over marginal cost, r. Thus we can drop the distinction between domestic prices
Fd and prices received in foreign markets and represent both of them by the symbol
p. Similar considerations applied to foreign firms show that their optimal pricing functions
are== na/i_a_fl. Furthermore,free flows of the final consumption good and free
borrowing and lending imply that and interest rates must be equalized across countries
(r =r*).As a result, durables bear the same price p38
in both countries. We can therefore conclude that
p == 1——fl (A.1O)
This fixed price is associated with constant values for d =d*and in =mthat are denoted
by with overbars: ,rn.
Freeentry into the durables sector ensures that the discounted value of revenue
minus variable costs equals design costs
=fe1'r(s)ds (s') ds'.
Differentiatingwith respect to time yields an arbitrage equation relating the interest rate
to current profits per dollar invested plus the percentage change in the value of designs
over time,
P r(t A r = +
A A
We seek a solution characterized by a constant value for A' in which case the arbitrage
equation reduces to:
== [p(+ñi*)—r(+ñ?*)]=( — 1)(+th*) (A.11)
Substituting p/i- =1—a—afrom (A.1O), and using p =(1_Q_fl)Lfi(d)_a_fi
= from (A.2) and (A.7), we obtain a relation between A'
d,andrn*,39
=(a÷/3Y(d+rn) = 2(1_a_fl)ifLfl[_a_fl+(1+r)_ñi*l_0_fl].





To solve for if ,,weimpose the symmetry condition j/40r =A*/Aw0=1/2,and
make use of the relation ñi= ff=(1+r)_h/(0,whichfollows from (A.4), (A.5), and








provides the basic technological relation between g and r for the model. In order to
solve for r and 14 =if—if,,we must consider the preference side of the model, which
will determine the other relation involving '-.
Let7(t) denote the redistribution of tariff revenues through rebates, let w denote
the wage for labor, and letdenote the wage for human capital. Also, let D(L) denote
the consumer's holdings of debt instruments, and assume that all firms are 100%
debt—financed. (With no uncertainty, debt is equivalent to equity.) The utility40




subject to D =rD+w(i)L+w1(t)ff+ 7(1) —C(i).
For now we treat r as a constant in the consumers problem. We show below that this is
consistent with the equilibrium conditions on the production side as well. The Hamiltonian
for this problem is





whichimplies that —= 4=Ar. Differentiating the expression =Awith
respect to time and then using the fact that A/A =—r)we obtain equation (5) in the text,
(A.14)
The level of C(.) is determined by the requirement that the consumer's intertemporal
budget constraint be satisfied. It can be verified that after substitution of the equilibrium'1
values of w(t),w1(t) andT(t), this forces C(t) to be equal to the aggregate output of
consumption goods at each time t.
Under balanced growth, the growth rate g is determined by the rate of growth of
the total number of inputs, world,4world, where =A+A.From equations (4a,b)
in the text, this is equal to
9 = 5ff. (A.15)
Inserting this into the expression for r gives
r =p+2oS!A. (A.16)
In order to solve out for and hence for r, and g, one must combine this preference
condition with the technological condition in (A.13). Substituting into (A.13) we obtain:
=ff—ff=ll_f(r)(p+2oSll) = (A.17)
with A and f(r) defined as in (A.13).
Along a balanced growth path the growth rate in the world and in each country is
given by g =gt=5gworld=
26114,so
T Ar) (A.18)
Because f(O)=1,thisreproduces the formula from Romer (1990b) for the growth rate in a
two—country symmetric world economy with r =r'=0.42
In the presence of tariffs, both the amount of R&D and the growth rate depend
negatively on the function 1(r).Thisfunction is equal to 1 when r= 0,increases with r
upto a unique maximum, and asymptotically approaches 1 as rgoesto infinity. This
generates the qualitative behavior reproduced in figure 3. This figure plots g as a
function of rforthe following parameter values: a+fi =2/3,511 =1.4,p =.05,=1.
The value for a+fl should be equal to the share of manufacturing income that is paid as
salaries. Only the product 511 is determined in this model, and the value of 0.14 was
chosen to make the feasible rates of growth reasonable. Setting u =1corresponds to the
choice of logarithmic utility.
A.2 Results from section 5 in the text
Output of final goods in the home country is given in equation (7) in the text. The
profit maximization's problem for given levels of ff, and L is
max T(L,1,d(.),m(.),n(.)) —f Pd(i)d(i) di —
d,m,n
di — d3. (A.19)
As above, the first order necessary conditions for profit maximization yield the derived
demands for d, m, and n and symmetrical expressions for d*,07*,and
Producersof traded durables choose output levels that equate marginal revenue in
each location to marginal costs. Since there are no tariffs, producers face the same demand
functions locally and abroad when they can sell in both markets. As a result, they will43
charge identical prices in both locations, Fd=Pm.=r/1_a_13. With free trade in final goods
and interest rate equalization, symmetric arguments give F=F=r/1_a—/3.
The maximization problem for producers of the j goods, which are not traded, is
max =p(n)n
—rn.
It can be easily verified that constant marginal costs and a constant elasticity demand
imply that P=r/l—a_fl for these goods as well. Consequently,= = i,and profit
for traded goods is twice the profit r for the nontraded goods.
Ex ante, a producer of new product does not know whether it will be able to sell its
output abroad. When bidding for a new design, the firm calculates the expected profits,
which is equal to the probability 1—q the good is not subject to foreign protection times
r, plus the probability q that it is denied access tothe foreign market times(By
symmetry, the probabilities of exclusion in the two countries, q and q*, are the Same.)
The price of new designs is equal to the discounted value of expected profits. The price bid







Then using the result {1—o---f3) =1,the expressions for p in terms of d, ,n, and n that
are derived from the demand curves, and the fact that the quantities chosen by the
monopolist are the same, == i,this can be expressed as44
=(1—g)(1__a_fl)( a÷fl) ifL( —a—fi1—afl)+g(1;a_fl) (a+fl) 110 L' '—°—
=(2_q)(l__(a÷fl)BLfidl_0_fi. (A.20)
As in the previous section, the result linking the growth rate and the interest rate on the
production side follows by equating the return to human capital in the research and
manufacturing sectors:
5p4world =-. = a_lLfl[I+I+J]dl_0_I3. (A.21)
Inserting the expression from equation (A.20) in for P4 in equation (A.21) and solving for
we obtain
117= Ar.
where A =a/(a+fl)(1—a—fl)as before.
We solve for the rate of growth as in the tariff example) by using equation (A.14) to
express the interest rate in terms of the balanced rate of growth for the economy,
world r =p+ og, where g ==
Aworld
Using equation (12) from the text to substitute for
world
AW0ld
yields g =2S1N.Together these two substitutions give
A [p+2oö11
2—q (A.22)
if can be removed from this expression by using the adding up constraint if =11Y"N11C45




into equation (A.22) and clearing for 1K yields
Ap
II— 5(2—g)
N 2Ao b + +
Equation(13) in the text then follows from
world g=5H